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CHAPTER 8 
State and Local Taxation 
MICHAEL B. ELEFANTE• 
§8.1. Introduction. Probably the most noteworthy event of the 1973 
Survey year in the area of state and local taxation was the rejection once 
again, by the voters of the Commonwealth, in November of 1972, of a 
constitutional amendment designed to authorize the Legislature to enact 
a graduated income tax,1 
But although no change as fundamental as the enactment of a gradu-
ated income tax resulted from the efforts of the Legislature or the courts 
during the Survey year, there were nevertheless several interesting de-
velopments in the area of state and local taxation. The first portion of 
this article will deal with the changes in the Massachusetts income tax 
rules concerning the computation of the basis of property subject to in-
come taxation in the state. These changes, which are part of a compre-
hensive technical revision of chapter 62 of the General Laws,2 represent 
the Legislature's attempt for the first time to reconcile a number of 
the differences in basis computation between Massachusetts and federal 
income taxation law. The second portion of this article will consider 
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Frost v. Commissioner of 
Corporations 0> Taxation,8 in which some interesting constitutional 
questions were raised regarding the application of the so-called estate 
"sponge" tax4 to intangible property located in Massachusetts owned by 
non-residents of the United States. 
§8.2. Recent revisions in Massachusetts income tax basis rules. In 
1971 the Legislature attempted for the first time to correlate the com-
putation of Massachusetts and federal taxable income in a comprehensive 
way.1 Although the effort was commendable, several ambiguities were 
• MICHAEL B. ELEFANTE is an associate with the firm of Hemenway Be Barnes, Boston. 
18.1. 1 For an analysis of First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney General, 1972 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1711, 290 N.E.2d 526, in which the constitutionality of legislation apparently 
attempting to influence the vote was considered, see the student comment in §14.!1 
infra. 
2 The changes are contained in Acts of 1975, c. 72!1, 17. 
a 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. !189, 29!1 N.E.2d 862. 
4 G.L c:. 65A, 11. 
§8.2. 1 Acts of 1971, c:. 555. 
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created, and various areas requiring attention were simply ignored. With 
· the assistance of the State Tax Committee of the Boston Bar Association,2 
the Legislature has now enacted legislation dealing with many of the 
problems left unsolved by its earlier effort.a One important area that had 
been left in uncertainty by earlier legislation was that of the relationship 
between the basis of property for Massachusetts income tax purposes and 
the basis for federal income tax purposes. In the new law the Legislature 
attempted to move toward a system under which the differences between 
Massachusetts and federal law, e~cept as they relate to fundamental 
differences in tax treatment, will disappear. This section will describe 
the system for relating federal and Massachusetts bases devised by the 
Legislature and will point out some remaining areas of uncertainty. 
Chapter 728 of the Acts of 1978 takes into account the existing dif-
ferences in the basis of property for Massachusetts and federal purposes 
to a limited extent in determining the "Massachusetts initial basis" of 
property. The intent of the statute is to eliminate to the greatest extent 
possible the differences between the Massachusetts initial basis of property 
and the federal initial basis, without completely doing away retroactively 
with all pre-existing differences. Under the new law the two bases will 
differ only for (1) property held by the taxpayer on December 31, 19704 
and subject to Massachusetts income tax on that datell and (2) property 
acquired after December 81, 1970, but with respect to which the "federal 
basis is determined in whole or in part by application of the basis of 
prior property.''& In the cases of property (1) acquired by purchase after 
December 81, 1970 and (2) held on December 81, 1970 but becoming 
subject to Massachusetts income taxation after that date, the Massa-
chusetts initial basis is determined ~y reference to the federal initial basis. 
In determining, for Massachusetts income tax purposes, whether the 
basis of property held on December 81, 1970 is to be calculated under 
prior Massachusetts law or under federal rules, the new statute applies 
prior state law only to "property as to which, if it had been sold on 
. 2 I would like to acknowledge the assistance of George A. Page, Jr., Chairman of the 
State Tax Committee of the Boston _Bar Association. Mr. Page was kind enough to 
provide me with the materials developed by the Committee before they were generally 
available. Those materials are now available to the public together with a brief, but 
comprehenaive, article about Acts of 1975, c. 725 in McGee Be Page, Massachusetts Income 
Tax-1975 Revisions, 17 Boston Bar J. 5 (Dec. 1975). That article includes the extremely 
useful technical explanation of the bill prepared by the Committee. I would also like 
to acknowledge the assistance of a number of the trust department employees of 
Hemenway Be Barnes. 
a Acts of 1975, c. 728. 
' The effective date of Acts of 1971, c. 555, was Jan. 1, 1971. 
II Acts of 1978, c. 728, §7(c)(l)(A). .· 
8 Acts of 1978, c. 725, §7(c)(2)(B). The "basis of prior property" is the "basis of such 
property in the hands of the transferor or of other property in the hands of the trans· 
feree." Acts of 1978, c. 72!1, §7(c)(2)(A). 
2
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December [31, 1970] in the course of business, a gain realized on such sale 
would have been taxable under this chapter to its then owner .... "7 
Despite this apparently narrow language, however, this standard was 
meant by the draftsmen to be "inclusive." That is, the standard was 
intended to describe any property the disposition of which by the taxpayer 
on December 31, 1970 would have been taxable under chapter 62 as 
then in effect or would have been so taxable if sold by the taxpayer in 
the ordinary course of business. The statute in this respect is not meant 
to apply only to property in fact held in the course of business on 
December 31, 1970. However, a superficial reading of the statute.suggests 
such a meaning and there is some reason to think that the unintentional 
ambiguity of the standard will cause confusion among tax preparers and 
auditors.s 
If the ambiguity of section 7(c)(l)(A) is resolved in the manner sug-
gested by its authors, the Massachusetts initial basis of property held by 
the taxpayer on December 31, 1970 should be determined under the new 
statute by reference to the basis of the property under chapter 62 on that 
date as to all property except: (I) property held by non-residents who 
have come into the Commonwealth after December 30, 1970, except real 
or tangible personal property having a situs in Massachusetts on De-
cember 31, 1970; (2) the property of all corporate trusts (partnerships, 
associations or trusts the beneficial interests of which are represented by 
transferable shares) except of those which exercised the pre-1971 election 
to be taxed; and (3) real property located outside the Commonwealth.9 
As to all other property held on December 31, 1970 the statute deems 
Massachusetts initial basis to be, for purposes of computing gain, the 
adjusted basis of the property under chapter 62 as then in effect, and for 
purposes of computing loss, the lower of that basis or the federal adjusted 
basis.1o 
The draftsmen of the legislation intentionally chose to eliminate the 
generally higher Massachusetts basis in computing loss, even though it is 
to be preserved for computing gain. They viewed the allowance of loss 
as a matter of legislative grace and apparently concluded that the allow-
ance of loss in these circumstances is not a matter to which that grace 
should extend.ll In making the choice of basis turn on whether a gain or 
loss is being computed, the statute creates a rather unfortunate gap which 
will have to lie resolved by regulation or further legislation. This gap 
appears in a situation in which the basis of property computed under 
7 Acts of 197!1, c. 72ll, §7(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
8 State Tax Cmnmittee of the Boston Bar Ass'n, Technical Explanation of Chapter 62 
(Income Tax) Provisions, reprinted in 17 Boston Bar J. 17, 2ll (Dec. 1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Technical Explanation]. 
D Technical Explanation at 24. 
10 Acts of 197!1, c. 72ll, 17(c)(1)(A). 
11 Technical Explanation at 23. 
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chapter 62 as it formerly existed is higher than both (1) the federal ad-
justed basis of the property and (2) the net proceeds received in dispo-
sition of the property where such proceeds exceed the federal adjusted 
basis. In such a situation there is obviously a gain under federal rules. 
However, if the transaction is thus characterized as one producing gain 
and the higher Massachusetts basis is chosen as required under the new 
law,12 the result is a loss. Yet the statute also requires that in computing 
loss, the lower of the Massachusetts and federal bases is to be chosen.13 
If the lower federal basis is chosen, however, a gain is produced; but in 
computing gain the higher Massachusetts basis must be used. There 
seems to be no solution in the statute to the circularity of this compu-
tation. 
The rules regarding the determination of the Massachusetts initial 
basis of property acquired after December 31, 1970 work rather well. If 
the taxpayer's federal basis of such property is determined without regard 
to the "basis of prior property,"14 the Massachusetts initial basis is the 
initial federal basis without regard to the adjustment for gift tax paid.15 
Where the taxpayer's federal basis is determined with regard to the 
"basis of prior property," the difference between the federal and Massa-
chusetts bases of prior property is preserved only if the acquisition trans-
action was not one producing a federal gain or loss.1s Where the 
acquisition produced a federal gain or loss, the difference in the federal 
and Massachusetts bases of prior property will have been taken into 
account by section 2 of the statute in the computation of the Massachu-
setts income tax result of the transaction.n Thus, in such cases the 
Massachusetts initial basis is the federal initial basis of the acquired 
property. 
Once the Massachusetts initial basis of property is determined, that 
basis is adjusted by applying the same adjustments made to federal basis 
with certain enumerated exceptions.1s These exceptions are limited 
12 Acts of 1973, c. 723, §7(c)(l)(A)(i). 
18 Acts of 1973, c. 723, §7(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
14 See note 6 supra. 
15 Acts of 1973, c. 723, §7(c)(2)(A). 
16 Acts of 1973, c. 723, §7(c)(2)(A)(i). 
17 Under §2(a) of the law, Massachusetts gross income is the same as federal gross 
income modified as required by §7(a) with other enumerated modifications. Section 7(a) 
provides that where federal gross income includes any item of gain or loss, it shall be 
adjusted in determining Massachusetts gross income by increasing (or decreasing) the 
federal gross income by the excess (deficit) of the federal adjusted basis of the property 
producing the item over the Massachusetts adjusted basis of the property. Thus, in any 
transaction in which there is even partial recognition of gain or loss federally, the 
Massachusetts result will have been to recognize more or less gain or loss to account for 
the basis difference. After the transaction the Massachusetts and federal basis of the 
acquired property can therefore be equal. Technical Explanation at 25. 
18 Acts of 197!1, c. 72!1, §7(d). 
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to those areas in which there is a genuine difference between the Massa-
chusetts and federal income tax treatment of item.19 A number of 
differences under prior law in federal and Massachusetts rules regarding 
the adjustment of basis, such as the differing Massachusetts and federal 
rules on the allocation of basis to stock rights received in a nontaxable 
distribution, seem to have been eliminated. For the foreseeable future at 
least, the changeover to the federal system of adjustments to basis will 
cause some rather anomalous results,20 but such a situation is the price to 
be paid if conversion to a system of substantial Massachusetts-federal 
equality is to be achieved without completely disregarding past differences. 
§8.3. Estate tax on intangibles in Massachusetts of decedents who 
were non-residents of the United States. Although many of the sub-
stantial number of decisions during the Survey year dealing with the 
general topic of Massachusetts taxation may be more significant, perhaps 
none is so interesting as the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation and its companion 
case, Shaw v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation.1 That decision 
is addressed to two factual situations raising questions concerning the 
validity of G.L. c. 65A, §1,2 which, in certain circumstances, imposes an 
19 Technical Explanation at 27. 
20 For example, in the case of a bond tax-exempt for both federal and Massachusetts 
purposes purchased at a premium prior to December 31, 1970, the Massachusetts basis 
of the bond as of December 31, 1970 will be the purchase price without regard to amor-
tization of the premium. For years after December 31, 1970 the basis will be adjusted 
by reducing it by the amount of amortization taken on the federal return even though 
that amortization is computed on the basis of the life of the bond after purchase and 
not simply the life of the bond after December 31, 1970. 
§8.3. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 889. 293 N.E.2d 862 (1978). 
2 The portion of G.L. c. 65A, §I with which the Frost decision is concerned enacts a 
"sponge" taX designed to absorb a portion of the unused credit available under §2011 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U.S.C. §2011 (1970), for amounts 
paid to any state, territory or the District of Columbia in respect of any estate, in-
heritance, legacy or succession tax. The "sponge" tax is designed to absorb a portion of 
the federal credit remaining after the payment of succession taxes, other than other 
"sponge" taxes, to the states, computed by applying to the remaining credit the ratio 
of the value of covered property in Massachusetts to the value of the entire federal 
gross estate. The relevant portion of G.L. c. 65A, §I reads: 
A taX is hereby imposed upon the transfer of real property or tangible personal 
property in the commonwealth of every person who at the time of death was a 
resident of the United States but not a resident of the commonwealth, and upon the 
transfer of all property, both real and personal, within the commonwealth of every 
person who at the time of death was not a resident of the United States, the amount 
of which shall be a sum equal to such proportion of the amount by which the credit 
allowable under the applicable federal revenue act for estate, inheritance, legacy 
and succession taXes actually paid to the several states exceeds the amount actually 
so paid for such taxes, exclusive of estate taxes based upon the difference between 
such credit and other estate taxes and inheritance, legacy and succession taxes, as 
the value of the property in the commonwealth bears to the value of the entire 
estate, subject to estate tax under the applicable federal revenue act. 
5
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estate tax on the transfer of intangible personal property within the 
Commonwealth of persons who have died residents of other nations. 
In the Frost case, the court dealt with the application of G.L. c. 65A, 
§1 to the estate of Timothy P. Kuhn, who had died a citizen of the United 
States but a resident and domiciliary of Rome. At the time of his death 
he left no real or tangible personal property in the Commonwealth. He 
did own intangible personal property consisting of interests in certain 
securities and cash held in brokerage accounts in Boston and. cash on 
deposit in a Boston bank. Kuhn's estate, under §2011 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954,8 was entitled to a credit for state taxes in the 
amount of $13,060.42. Under the apportionment formula of G.L. c. 65A, 
§1, $10,022.57 was due the Commonwealth. No estate, inheritance, legacy 
or succession taxes were paid to any other state. 
After paying the tax, Frost, Kuhn's executor, petitioned for abatement, 
claiming that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
it was impermissible for the Commonwealth to impose any transfer tax 
on Kuhn's intangibles in Massachusetts. The petitioner also asserted that 
under the equal protection clause it was unconstitutional to impose a 
tax on the transfer of intangible assets in Massachusetts of non-residents 
who are domiciliaries of other countries when no such· tax is imposed on 
the transfer of the intangible assets in Massachusetts of the decedent 
residents of other states.• 
In the Shaw case, the court dealt with the application of G.L. c. 65A, §1 
to intangibles held under an inter vivos trust. The trust had been 
established in Massachusetts while its settlor, Marian Lady Bateman, was 
a resident of Massachusetts. Subsequently, Lady Bateman became a Brit-
ish subject and died a resident of Monaco. From the time of its forma-
tion one of the trustees of the trust had always been a Massachusetts 
resident and the securities held by the trust had always been kept in 
Boston. Under the trust, after an annuity for her husband, Lady Bate-
man was entitled to the income for her life and retained a power of 
appointment over the distribution of the trust corpus on her death. 
8 26 u.s.c. §2011 (1970). 
4 Frost also argued that as applied to him G.L c. 65A, §1 violated Part II, c. 1, §l, 
art. 4 of the Massachusetts Constitution which authorizes the General Court to impose 
"proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes •••. " This requirement has 
been interpreted as barring unequal taxes founded on immaterial differences in fact. 
Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 596, 597 (1929). For reasons which were basically the 
same as those on which it relied in making its decision on the federal equal protection 
argument, the court rejected this contention. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 405-407, 293 
N.E.2d at 874. 
Frost and Shaw also argued that on the facts G.L c. 65A, §1 violated art. 10 of the 
Declaration of Rights. Since this provision has been construed as providing the same 
protection as the equal protection clause, this contention was also disposed of by the 
court's treatment of the federal equal protection argument. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 391 
n.3, 293 N.E.2d at 865 n.3. 
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Under§ 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code, the maximum federal credit 
for state death taxes was $254,462.37. The trustees paid that amount to 
the Commonwealth under G.L. c. 65A, §1,5 claiming the appropriate 
credit on the federal estate tax return, only to discover that the Internal 
Revenue Service took the position that no tax was payable to Massa-
chusetts by reason of G.L. c. 65A, §I and, consequently, that no credit 
against the federal tax was available. 
The trustees filed a petition for instructions seeking a determination 
of whether or not the tax was owed to the Commonwealth. The United 
States declined to waive its sovereign immunity and to become a party 
to the case.6 As a result, in order to avoid double payment, the trustees, 
like the executor in the Frost case, argued that Massachusetts could not 
properly impose a tax under G.L. c. 65A, §1, on the ground that the im-
position of such a tax on intangibles located in Massachusetts and owned 
by non-residents of the United States but not on intangibles located in 
Massachusetts and owned by residents of other states was a denial of 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
The court held first that the imposition of an estate tax on the Massa-
chusetts intangibles owned by Kuhn did not violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reasoned that the line 
of cases beginning with Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,s includ-
ing Baldwin v. Missouri,9 which established the principle that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibited multiple state taxation of intangible per-
II Apparently, the assets of the inter vivos trust made up the entirety of Lady Bate-
man's federal gross estate. See 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at !192, 293 N.E.2d at 865. 
6 The inability to include the United States as a party meant, of course, that one of 
the real parties in interest was not a participant. Under the Internal Revenue Code and 
G.L c. 65A, §1, at least so long as conflicting determinations are avoided, the taxpayer 
is indifferent to whether he pays the tax to the United States or partially to one or more 
states since the aggregate tax paid remains the same. This results in the inequity of 
forcing an indifferent party to the expense of arguing the case for the federal government. 
Moreover, since the United States was not a party, the decision of the court that a tax 
might properly be levied under G.L c. 65A, §l would not necessarily be conclusive on 
the question of the eligibility of such payments for the federal credit. 1973 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 393 n.5, 293 N.E.2d at 866 n.5. To help resolve the dilemma, the court ordered 
that the final decree in both cases provide that it might be reopened in the event the 
United States Supreme Court decided that the payment made was not eligible for the 
federal credit. 
Apparently the refusal of the United States to waive sovereign immunity followed an 
informal discussion between Shaw's counsel and the Solicitor General in which the 
Solicitor General agreed that it would make good sense for the United States to remain 
a party so that the matter might be finally resolved. Brief of the Petitioner at 4, Shaw 
v. Commissioner of Corporations&: Taxation, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 293 N.E.2d 862. 
'l Shaw did not raise a due process argument since under Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 
!157 (19!19), Massachusetts clearly could impose an estate tax without violating the due 
process clause. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 394 n.7, 293 N.E.2d at 867 n.7. 
8 280 u.s. 204 (19!10). 
9 281 u.s. 586 (19!10). 
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sonal property, had been effectively overruled by subsequent cases, 
particularly Curry v. McCanless,1° and State Tax Commission v. 
Aldrich.11 Having concluded that no due process limitation barred the 
application of G.L. c. 65A, §1, the court was faced with the question of 
whether its application violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Following the principle that in cases dealing 
with economic regulation a classification will not be found to violate the 
equal protection clause so long as it has a fair and rational relation to 
the object sought to be accomplished, the court decided that the taxation 
of the transfer of intangibles owned by non-residents of the United 
States, but not residents of other states, was constitutional. Emphasizing 
the fact that the imposition of the tax would not result in a larger tax 
payment, the court held that the Commonwealth stood in sufficiently 
different relation to non-residents of the United States than to residents 
of other states, to justify the difference in classification.12 
The holding of the court in the Frost case on the due process issue 
seems to be generally justified. The history of the United States Supreme 
Court's treatment of the application of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the taxation of intangibles by a state is a 
peculiar one. Within a relatively short period of time there have been 
several obvious shifts in position. Initially, the Supreme Court held, in 
effect, that any state with a sufficient relationship to the owner of 
intangible personal property, to its issuer, or to the property itself might 
levy a tax upon its transfer.1B It was assumed that inheritance taxes on 
intangibles could be imposed both by the state of the domicile of the 
decedent and by other states having a relationship to the property. In the 
early 1930's the Supreme Court changed its view on the taxation of 
intangibles. The change seems to have been inspired by the incongruity 
between the holding of the Court in Frick v. Pennsylvania,14 that death 
taxes on tangible personal property might be imposed only by the state 
in which the property was situated and not by the state of the domicile 
10 807 u.s. !157 (19!19). 
11 !116 u.s. 174 (1942). 
12 The court pointed out in a footnote that the petitioners were arguably in no 
position to raise the equal protection argument since they were in no way harmed by 
an inequality in treatment arising from G.L. c. 65A, §1. See note 4 supra. The court 
nevertheless decided to treat the taxpayers as if they bad a valid basis for making the 
argument. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sb. at !194 n.6, 29!1 N.E.2d at 866 n.6. As a result of the 
position taken by the Internal Revenue Service in the Shaw estate tax audit, the 
petitioners in the Shaw case were at least for the moment harmed by the assessment of 
the Massachusetts estate tax. 
18 Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (190!1) (inheritance tax imposed by New York on 
bank deposit in New York owned by Illinois resident): Wheeler v. Sohmer, 2!1!1 U.S. 4!14 
(1914) (promissory notes physically present in taxing state): Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 
U.S. 1 (1928) (tax by state of domicile of owner). 
14 268 u.s. 47!1 (1925). 
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of the owner, and the multiple death taxation of intangibles. The 
Court accomplished this by creating a rule forbidding multiple taxation 
of intangibles and limiting taxation to the state of the domicile of the 
owner.11i Farmers' Loan was quickly followed by a number of other cases 
carrying out some of the logical conclusions of the decision. These 
included Baldwin v. Missouri,16 directly on point here, which held un-
constitutional the imposition by Missouri of an inheritance tax on bonds, 
notes and cash present in Missouri but owned by an Illinois decedent. 
Somewhat surprisingly, within ten years the Court substantially backed 
away from these holdings and returned to the law as it had previously 
existed. The case which broke the Farmers' Loan rationale was Curry v. 
McCanless.17 In that case a Tennessee resident had established a trust in 
Alabama retaining a testamentary power of appointment and the right to 
income for life. The trust assets had been held in Alabama since the 
establishment of the trust. The trust at all times had an Alabama trustee. 
The right of Tennessee to impose an inheritance tax on the trust assets on 
the death of the settlor seemed clear under existing authority. Also clear 
was the substantial relationship between Alabama and the property. The 
Court was thus faced with a situation in which the application of the 
single place of taxation rationale of Farmers' Loan required the denial 
of the seemingly just claims of a second state. Not surprisingly, the 
Court bent in Curry and held that Alabama could constitutionally im-
pose a death tax on the trust assets in addition to that which might be 
imposed by Tennessee. However, the Court seemed to break the Farmers' 
Loan line of cases altogether in State Tax Commission v. Aldrich,1s 
which expressly overruled one of the progeny of Farmers' Loan.1o In 
Aldrich it was held that the state of the incorporation of a corporation 
might constitutionally impose a tax on the transfer of the stock of the 
corporation. In the face of a rather heated dissenting opinion2o by 1 ustice 
1 ackson, the Court appeared to abandon the essentials of the rationale of 
Farmers' Loan by holding that a state which has extended benefits or 
protection to property or can demonstrate the practical fact of its power 
over the property could tax its transfer on death. 
In light of Aldrich, the court's decision in Frost on the due process 
issue seems correct. However, curiously enough, the Aldrich decision has 
not been followed by other decisions overruling Farmers' Loan itself and 
its progeny, including Baldwin v. Missouri. The court could have read 
111 Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930). 
16 281 u.s. 586 (1930). 
17 307 u.s. 357 (1939). 
18 316 u.s. 174 (1942). 
19 First Nat'1 Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932). 
20 Justice Jackson stated: " ••• I therefore take today's decision to mean that any state 
may lay substantially any tax on any transfer of intangible personal property toward 
which it can spell out a conceivable legal relationship." 316 U.S. at 201. 
9
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Curry and Aldrich more narrowly than it did. These cases can be read as 
establishing the proposition that intangibles may be taxed by any state 
with a sufficient relationship to a person with a legal interest in the in-
tangibles.21 In Frost the only persons subject to control in Massachusetts 
were persons with what could be seen as a mere custodial interest in the 
property. It could, therefore, be argued that Massachusetts, even though 
it had extended protection to the property, nevertheless had no relation-
ship with the legal owner of the property which would justify taxation. 
On the other hand, the less formalistic approach of the court in Frost 
seems more attuned to the general development of law in this area, 
which has increasingly abandoned nice legal distinctions in favor of 
what could be characterized as a more pragmatic approach.22 For ex-
ample, the protections afforded by the laws of a state in which intangi-
bles are held, whether they are held by a trustee or by a broker or other 
custodian, are substantially the same.2s Although legal forms have his-
torically been important in this area, the relative equality of the state's 
relationship to the property in both cases seems to justify the same 
treatment for purposes of taxation. 
·The decision of the court on the due process issue made its decision of 
the equal protection question more difficult. Under the court's reasoning 
the Commonwealth could constitutionally have enacted legislation im-
posing a "sponge" tax on intangible property in Massachusetts of both 
residents of other states and non-residents of the United States. This 
clearly raised the equal protection question of whether there was a 
permissible reason for choosing to tax the intangibles of non-residents of 
the United States, but not those of residents of other states. The equal 
protection standard applicable to a case such as this can be variously 
phrased,2• but as the court was candid enough to admit, in a situation 
21 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 311 (1944) (dissenting opinion). 
22 See, e.g., Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 548 (1948) (New York could 
escheat unclaimed insurance proceeds if it had "sufficient contacts with the transactions 
•• ~ to justify the exertion of the power ••• .'?. See also the dissent of Justice Jackson 
in State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185 (1942). 
23 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 398, 293 N.E.2d at 869. 
24 The constitutional standard imposed by the equal protection clause in cases dealing 
with economic regulation is a good deal more flexible than the standard applicable to 
cases dealing with racial classifications and the like. See generally Developments in the 
Law, Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1076-1131 (1969). But whether phrased 
positively ("Differences of classification for purposes of state taxation must be based 
upon real and substantial underlying differences of fact having some reasonable relation 
to the purpose for which the classification is made ..•. " Brief of the Petitioner, Frost 
v. Commissioner of Corporations, at 17, citing Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 
562, 572 (1949)) or negatively (" ••. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if 
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it •••• " McGowan v. Maryland, 
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)), the standard requires that there be some rational explanation 
for the differences in classification. 
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like this, where a clear distinction is drawn, the question becomes whether 
there "is some logical justification for the classification."21i 
The primary justification found by the court was that in the case of 
residents of other states it was possible that the state of domicile would 
apply a "sponge" tax to all the intangibles of a decedent. Thus, there 
would be a possibility of double "sponge" taxation of intangibles. This 
possibility, according to the court, would not exist in the case of residents 
of other nations whose domiciliary jurisdictions· would not attempt to 
impose such a "sponge" tax.26 The court also pointed out that some of 
the risk of double death taxation of intangible property, however de-
nominated, in the case of residents of other countries was eliminated by 
tax conventions to which the United States was a party and by the 
credit allowed by §201427 of the Internal Revenue Code for death or 
estate taxes paid to another country with respect to assets includible in 
the decedent's federal gross estate.2s 
In the narrow context of the cases before it, th~ court's decision on the 
equal protection question seems proper. The "sponge" tax imposed by 
G.L. c. 65A, §1 relates to a credit for taxes paid only to other states, 
United States territories or the District of Columbia. No foreign juris-
diction could therefore attempt to take advantage of §2011 of the Internal 
Revenue Code by enacting its own "sponge" tax. Since the jurisdiction 
of other domiciliary states to impose a "sponge" tax on intangibles of 
their domiciliaries located in Massachusetts is clear, the Legislature might 
assume that such taxes would in fact be imposed by sister states. To avoid 
the double taxation of intangibles resulting from the imposition of a 
"sponge" tax by both the state of domicile and Massachusetts in cases in 
which intangibles are located in the Commonwealth, the Legislature 
might choose to exercise less than its full jurisdiction by deciding not to 
impose a "sponge" tax on intangibles in Massachusetts owned by resi-
dents of other states. The same concern for the double taxation resulting 
from the imposition of a "sponge" tax on intangibles by the jurisdiction 
of domicile would, of course, not apply in the case of residents of other 
countries.29 
211 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 40!1-04, 29!1 N.E.2d at 872 . 
.116 A survey conducted by the court disclosed that more than 75% of the states 
impose a "sponge" tax on the intangibles of deceased residents. 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sb. at 
404 n.l6, 29!1 N.E.2d at 87!1 n.l6 • 
.117 26 u.s.c. §2014 (1970). 
28 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 405, 293 N.E.2d at 87!1. It ought to be noted that the credit 
allowed by §2014 of the Internal Revenue Code applies only to property taxed by an-
other nation and "situated within such foreign country." Even within the context of the 
rules of exclusion and inclusion of §§2104 and 2105, it is still possible that another 
country might impose death taxes on intangibles within the United States of a resident 
of the taxing country. These taxes could not be credited against the tax imposed by 
the Code. 
29 There could, of course, be double "sponge" taxation of the intangibles in Massa-
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Although the decision of the court on the equal protection argument 
may be correct in light of the distinction the court found the Legislature 
might have drawn between the possibility of double "sponge" taxation of 
the intangibles in Massachusetts of residents of other states as opposed 
to those of residents of other nations, interesting light is shed on the case 
by an analysis of what appears to have been the actual purpose of the 
Legislature in making the distinction. Prior to the amendment of G.L. 
c. 65A, §1 the state of the law was represented by the Farmers' Loan line 
of cases. Under those cases it was clear that a state could not constitution-
ally impose an inheritance tax on the transfer of intangibles located 
within the state owned by nonresident decedents. In 1933 the law argu-
ably suffered a slight change due to the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Burnet v. Brooks.8o In that case the court held that the United States 
might impose an estate tax on the intangibles in the United States of a 
resident of another country. In reaching its decision, the Court indicated 
that the single tax rule of Farmers' Loan and its progeny was based upon 
considerations of federalism, rather than on concepts of jurisdiction as 
such.s1 In its relations with other nations the United States was, of 
course, not limited by notions of federalism and could tax to the full ex-
tent of its jurisdiction, which the Court held, reached c intangibles within 
the United States of non-resident decedents. 
The decision in Burnet v. Brooks was certainly capable of an interpre-
tation supporting the proposition that a state, as well as the federal 
government, may tax the intangible property within the state of a resi-
dent of another nation. Nevertheless, the Court was careful in its opin-
ion to limit what it said to the power of the federal govemment.82 It is 
also true that, in other respects, different rules have continued to exist 
concerning the power of a state to tax property outside the country in 
contrast to the power of the federal government to do so.88 For example, 
although the United States in some circumstances may tax the tangible 
personal property of a United States citizen located outside its jurisdic-
tion,84 a state may not do so.811 However, the language of the Court's 
chusetts of a resident of another country. For example, the state of inoorporation of a 
corporation whose securities were held in Massachusetts might impose such a tax. Also, 
it is possible that the state of organization of a broker with an office in Massachusetts 
might tax the transfer of securities held by the broker. See Brief of Petitioner at 14, 
Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 293 
N.E.2d 862. To that extent the distinction drawn by the Legislature is not completely 
accurate. 
80 288 u.s. 378 (1935). 
81 288 U.S. at 401. 
82 288 U.S. at 405 (" •.• we in no way limit the au·thority of our decisions as to 
state power •••• "). 
88 Brief of the Petitioner at 15, Frost v. Commissioner of Corporations 8c Taxation, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389,293 N.E.2d 862. 
84 United States v. Bennett, 2!12 U.S. 299 (1914). 
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opinion in Burnet certainly could be read to say that a state could im-
pose a death tax on intangibles within the state of a decedent who was a 
resident of another nation. In addressing the argument that the Farmers' 
Loan cases limited the power of the federal government to tax the in-
tangible property involved in Burnet, the Court stated that 
the limits of state power are defined in view of the relation of the 
states to each other in the Federal Union. The bond of the Consti-
tution qualified their jurisdiction. This is the principle which under-
lies the decisions cited by the respondents. These decisions estab-
lished that proper regard for the relation of the states in our system 
required that the property under consideration should be taxed in 
only one state, and that jurisdiction to tax was restricted accord-
ingly.86 
The language of the Court certainly suggests that the considerations under-
lying the Farmers' Loan cases would not be present in analyzing the 
relationship of a state to the intangible property of a resident of another 
country. Moreover, distinctions drawn in cases involving other sorts of 
property may not be applicable to intangible property. For example, the 
power of the United States to tax the tangible personal property of its 
citizens located outside its jurisdiction is based upon notions of citizen-
ship which are not applicable to state citizenship, which is not extra-
territorial.37 In contrast, the power of a jurisdiction to tax intangibles 
located within its borders but owned by non-residents is based on 
physical location and the attendant protections afforded by the taxing 
jurisdiction, a consideration that applies to the federal government and 
the states alike.88 The Burnet decision could thus have been interpreted as 
supporting the extension of the tax imposed by G.L. c. 65A, §1, as it 
then read, to intangible property in Massachusetts owned by nonresidents 
of the United States.s9 
The history of Acts of 1933, c. 316, the legislation amending G.L. c. 
65A, §1, strongly suggests that it was a result of such a reading of Burnet. 
The Act was based upon a bill submitted to the Legislature on behalf of 
Henry F. Long, the then Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 
shortly after the decision of the Supreme Court in Burnet.4o Although 
the official legislative history is inconclusive, contemporary commen-
tators clearly understood Acts of 1933, c. 316 to be an attempt to extend 
811 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925). 
86 288 U.S. at 401. 
87 Note, 47 Harv. L Rev. 307, 311 n.22 (1933). 
88 Id. 
89 Accord, In re Lloyd's Estate, 185 Wash. 61, 52 P.2d 1269 (1936); In re Estate of 
McCreery, 220 Cal. 26, 29 P.2d 186 (1934). 
40 Mass. Legis. Doc. H. 1318 (1933). 
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"sponge" tax levied by the Commonwealth to the full extent thought to 
be allowed by Bumet:n 
Thus, at the time it was amended, G.L. c. 65A, §1, rather than repre-
senting an effort to extend the tax power of the state only to cases where 
no possibility of double taxation existed, represented an attempt to ex-
tend the tax levied to what was thought to be the full extent of juris-
diction of the state.42 Under the view of the law represented by Acts of 
1933, c. 316, the equal' protection argument disappears:18 The intangibles 
in Massachusetts of the residents of other countries are subject to tax 
but those of the residents of other states are not, because the former class 
of property is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, but the latter is 
not. Thus, had the court decided the due process portion of the case by 
relying on Burnet, rather than by finding the whole rationale of Farmers' 
Loan. to have been abandoned, the equal protection issue decision would 
have been far easier to resolve. Such an approach would also have had the 
virtue of deciding the case on a narrow ground consistent with the hold-
ings of both Farmers' Loan and later cases.44 One suspects that, if the 
court considered it, it did not take such an approach because it was un-
comfortable with the narrowness of Burnet. Moreover, a decision which 
recognized continuing vitality in Farmers' Loan may have seemed less 
than honest to the court. 
Even if the court were unwilling to rely on Burnet in deciding the 
due process issue, the equal protection decision might have been more 
candid if the court recognized the process by which the Legislature drew 
the distinction it did in G.L. c. 65A, §1. Once the court decided the due 
process portion of the case on grounds which would support the exten-
sion of jurisdiction to the intangibles in Massachusetts owned by residents 
of other states, the court should have recognized that the rationale of the 
Legislature in drawing the distinction it did in G.L. c. 65A, §1 was no 
longer valid. That admission need not have resulted in a holding that 
the statute denied equal protection to non-residents of the United States. 
41 47 Harv. L Rev. at Sl4-15; Developments in the Law, Taxation-19SS, 47 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1209, 1222 (19!13). 
42 Interestingly, the ultimate result of these two rather different approaches is the 
same if one is willing to attribute to the Legislature the purpose attributed to it by the 
court in Frost. In the end both approaches result in a decision not to tax the intangibles 
of residents of other states at the place of the physical location of the documents 
evidencing such property. Prior to the abandonment of Farmers' Loan this result was 
constitutionally mandated. After Frost and the other cases diverging from Farmers' Loan 
the decision is a policy decision to avoid the same evil of multiple taxation which it was 
once thought to be proscribed by the Constitution. 
48 This is support for the proposition that this form of under-inclusion is permis-
sible. 
44 The Commonwealth did not argue this ground but the petitioners did deal with 
Bumet in their brief. The court was aware of the argament and expressly declined to 
take the route presented. 197~ Mass. Adv. Sh. at S97 n.ll, 29!1 N.E..2d at 868~69 n.ll. 
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The court could have held that since in its view the difference in the 
possibility of the imposition of a "sponge" tax by the jurisdiction of 
domicile was sufficient to support the distinction drawn by G.L. c. 65A, 
§1, it would prospectively attribute such a purpose to the distinction and 
uphold its validity. Such an attribution of purpose seems wholly consis-
tent with the cases in the area of economic regulation,411 Additionally, 
although the result is the same as that reached by the court in Frost, 
the process by which the result has been achieved is explicit and consis-
tent with the actual background of the statute. This explicitness may 
also have drawn to the attention of the Legislature the change in the law 
resulting from Frost and may have presented to it the question of whether 
the distinction drawn by G.L. c. 65A, §1 is one which still makes sense. 
More generally, such an approach might have more clearly raised for 
the Legislature the question of how to deal with the taxation of intan-
gibles in the legal world of multiple taxation. 
u See, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1077-81 
(1969). 
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